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RAHN v. GERDTS:*
ILLINOIS STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS DENIED
Since the Illinois Supreme Court first recognized a cause of
action for strict products liability,' Illinois courts have attempted to delineate the scope of this developing form of liability.2 Concurrently, the courts have demonstrated a willingness
to expand recovery for emotional distress. 3 These separate developments converged in Rahn v. Gerdts.4 In Rahn, the Illinois
*

119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807 (1983).

1. The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized strict products liability
in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In
Suvada, the court adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as the basis for liability in such actions. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
For the text of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see infra
note 22.
In this note, "strict products liability" is used to refer only to products
liability actions based on strict liability. "Products liability" is a broader
concept that also includes actions brought on theories of negligence and
breach of warranty. For a discussion of products liability under the three
separate theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, and
their inter-relationship, see, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS
PROCESS 650-98 (2d ed. 1981); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
641-82 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978) (defining
when a product is unreasonably dangerous); Winnet v. Winnet, 57 Ill. 2d 7,
310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (stating who is entitled to bring an action); Lowrie v.
City of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923 (1977) (defining "product"). For an overview of the development of the strict products liability
doctrine, see Snyman, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in the United States, 11 ANGLO-AM. 241 (1982). See also Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, 50 MrNN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (general discussion of strict
products liability); Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965) (general discussion of strict
products liability). For a review of Illinois decisions applying the doctrine,
see Buser, Strict Products Liability Litigation in Review, 70 ILL. B.J. 148
(1981).
3. Illinois recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Knierem v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). Recovery was extended to include negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). For a
discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Proehl, Anguish
of Mind: Damagesfor Mental Suffering under Illinois Law, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
477 (1961); Reidy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Illinois. Living in the Past,Suffering in the Present, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 295 (1981). See
also Sabin, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress-Seventeen Years
Later, 66 ILL. B.J. 248 (1978).
4. 119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807 (1983).
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Appellate Court for the Third District confronted the issue of
whether a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress
in strict products liability actions where the plaintiff alleges no
physical injuries. 5 The court held that damages for emotional
distress are not recoverable in strict products liability actions
absent physical injury. 6 The Rahn court determined, however,
that the injuries alleged were sufficient to state a cause of action
7
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Rahns leased a motor home from the Gerdtses 8 and
were driving it when a gas tank disengaged and burst into
flames.9 They escaped from the flaming vehicle without serious
physical injuries. 10 The Rahns filed an action against the lessor
of the motor home based on a strict products liability theory.'
5. Id. at 784, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
6. Id.

7. Id. at 781, 455 N.E.2d at 810. The court considered the issue because
counts IX, X, XI, & XII of the complaint alleged negligence as an alternative
basis of liability. See infra note 11.
8. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 455 N.E.2d at 808. The
Gerdtses were in the business of leasing motor homes. For a discussion of
lessor liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see
infra note 14.
9. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 455 N.E.2d at 808.
10. Mrs. Rahn did sustain a scratch to her arm and an immediate pain in
her chest. Id. The court apparently assumed that these minor physical injuries would be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of an impact. For a
discussion of the court's characterization of these injuries and the impact
rule, see infra note 40.
11. The Rahns brought counts I and V against the Gerdtses based upon
strict products liability. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 111. App. 3d at 784, 455 N.E.2d at
809. These counts alleged that the vehicle was defective and unreasonably
dangerous due to an insecure fuel tank, that the defect was present when it
left the control of the defendants, and that the defendants were liable for
placing the vehicle into the stream of commerce since they were in the business of leasing and selling the vehicle. Id., 455 N.E.2d at 808-09. Count V
alleged property damage and Mr. Rahn's loss of consortium. Id., 455 N.E.2d
at 809. This count was originally dismissed along with the products liability
counts in the complaint. On rehearing, however, the Rahn court remanded
Count V in a supplemental opinion. Id. at 787, 455 N.E.2d at 811. The court
relied on Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 M11.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443
(1982), which held that strict liability in tort applies to physical injury to
property. Id.
The Rahns brought counts II and VI against Deluxe Mobile Homes
Sales, Inc., (hereinafter Deluxe), the dealer who sold the motor home to the
Gerdtses. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 455 N.E.2d at 809. Both
counts were based on a strict products liability theory. Id. The Gerdtses
and Deluxe claimed that ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 801-804 (1983), provided
them with a defense to the action. Id. That statute provides that a nonmanufacturing defendant can be dismissed from a products liability action
upon the filing of an affidavit which certifies the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product which causes the injury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 801 (1983). The Gerdtses and Deluxe argued that they should have been
dismissed from the action when they filed such an affidavit. Brief for Appellee (Deluxe) at 9 and Brief for Appellees (Gerdts) at 4, Rahn v. Gerdts, 119
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The Rahns alleged that Mrs. Rahn suffered from "severe depression, anxiety and nervousness" 12 as a proximate result of an unreasonably dangerous defect in the vehicle, 13 that the defect
existed when the vehicle left the defendant's control, and that
the defendant was liable for placing the defective vehicle into

Ill. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807 (1983). Plaintiffs argued that the statute did
not apply where the manufacturer is not legally and, therefore, not financially responsible. Reply Brief for Appellants at 1, Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill.
App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807 (1983). The statute provides for vacating dismissal of a defendant if the plaintiff can show that the "manufacturer is unable
to satisfy any judgment as determined by the court" or if "the court determines that the manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 802(d) 802(e) (1983). The Rahns had settled out of court with the manufacturer.
These exceptions to dismissal would not appear to apply when the manufacturer has settled with the plaintiff; however, the Rahn court did not discuss the statute or its possible application.
Counts X and XII, brought against Deluxe, alleged negligent inspection
or failure to inspect as a basis for liability. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at
784, 455 N.E.2d at 809. The court dismissed these Counts, stating that Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975), negated any duty on the part of the seller to inspect a used vehicle. Id. at 786,
455 N.E.2d at 810-11. The court noted that Peterson dealt specifically with
strict liability yet stated that the language in that case appeared to support
dismissal. Id. The Rahn court, therefore, applied a principle expounded in
a strict products liability case to the negligence counts of the complaint. Id.
It was also willing to do the reverse. Id. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
12. Mrs. Rahn was admitted to a psychiatric unit nine weeks after the
incident and was under psychiatric care when she filed suit. Rahn v.
Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 455 N.E.2d at 808.
13. In Illinois, the plaintiff in a strict products liability action must not
only prove that the product was in a defective condition, but also that the
defective conditiorl was unreasonably dangerous and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control. Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). The Illinois Supreme Court
has stated that a product is unreasonably dangerous if it "fail [s] to perform
in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of (its] nature and intended function." Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339,
342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969). The Illinois Supreme Court later adopted the
test that is set forth in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 412 N.E.2d 959,
962 (1980); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 211-12, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978).
Comment i states that "unreasonably dangerous" means "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965). Illinois juries are instructed that "unreasonably dangerous"
means "unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable considering
the nature and function of the (product]." ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CrvuL § 400.06 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.).
Other jurisdictions do not require the plaintiff to prove that the defect
is unreasonably dangerous. The California Supreme Court, for example,
has held that the plaintiff in a strict products liability action need only
prove that the product was defective. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 125, 501 P.2d 1153, 899 (1962). The Cronincourt stated that to require a
plaintiff to prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous, in addition
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the stream of commerce. 14 The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Rahns appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court
15
for the Third District.
One of the issues presented on appeal was whether Mrs.
Rahn's emotional injuries were compensable under a strict
products liability theory. 16 The court also addressed the companion issue of whether the injuries alleged were sufficient to
17
state a cause of action under a negligence theory of liability.
The court held that while Mrs. Rahn's injuries were not compensable under a strict products liability theory, 18 they were sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of
19
emotional distress.
In analyzing the strict products liability issue, the Rahn
to proving that it was defective, results in the submission of the case to the
jury in the posture of a negligence case. Id.
For a discussion of the defective condition and unreasonably dangerous
requirements, see Swartz, The Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products Liability Law, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 280
(1983). For a discussion of the tests applied to determine whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous in Illinois, see Huntley, The Concept of Defect in
Illinois Products Liability Litigation,71 ILL. B.J. 22 (1982).
14. These allegations are the basic elements needed to state a cause of
action under a strict products liability theory. Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). The Suvada court stated that in
order to state a strict products liability cause of action "[tIhe plaintiffs must
prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product;
that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one; and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control." Id. The court
stated that its views coincided with the position expressed in § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
The Restatement provides for the liability of "sellers." For the text of
§ 402A of the Restatement, see infra note 22. Liability has, however, been
extended to lessors. Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178
(1971). The Gallucio court held that the policy considerations which justify
imposition of strict products liability are as applicable to lessors as they are
to manufacturers and sellers. Id. at 277-79, 274 N.E.2d at 184-86. For a discussion of these policy considerations, see inf/ra note 52. One appellate
court refused to extend strict products liability to a service station that supplied a customer with a defective tire gauge. Glliland v. Rothermel, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 116, 403 N.E.2d 759 (1980). The court held that the policy reasons for
imposing strict liability did not exist because supplying the tire gauge was
only incidental to the defendant's business and was not a part of the defendant's overall marketing scheme. Id. at 119, 403 N.E.2d at 761. See also
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969)
(strict products liability extended to wholesalers and distributors); Brannon v. Southern Illinois Hosp. Corp., 69 Ill. App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978)
(strict products liability extended to installers).
15. The trial court dismissed the complaint without discussion. Rahn v.
Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 785, 455 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1983).
16. Id. at 784, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 810.
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court relied on Woodill v. Parke Davis Co. 20 and discussed
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority.21 The Woodill court denied recovery for emotional distress in strict products liability
actions based on its interpretation of "physical harm" in Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 22 It found that the
drafters of Section 402A did not intend to allow recovery for
20. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), aff'g 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d
683 (1978). In Woodill, a mother brought an action against a drug manufacturer for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of witnessing her
son's debilitating reactions to a drug administered during the child's delivery. Id. at 29, 402 N.E.2d at 197. The complaint alleged that the manufacturer's failure to warn of the drug's harmful effects rendered it
unreasonably dangerous. Id. The Woodill court held that, in failure to warn
cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the product before a duty to
warn will be imposed. Id. at 33, 402 N.E.2d at 198. The court stated that
imposing this knowledge requirement focuses on the nature of the product
and on the adequacy of the warning rather than on the nature of the manufacturer's conduct. Id. at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 199. But see Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974) (knowledge requirement rejected because it concentrates on defendant's conduct rather than
condition of product). For a discussion of Woodill, see Note, Woodill v.
Parke Davis: The Failureto Warn as a Basisfor Recovery, 13 LoxY. U. CHI.
L.J. 523 (1982).
In Woodill the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held, in the
alternative, that damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in strict
products liability actions. Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355,
402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1978). The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the appellate court on this issue in Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 79 Ill.
2d 26, 38, 402 N.E.2d 194, 202 (1980). The Rahn court, therefore, was relying
upon the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the appellate court's reasoning when it cited Woodill as precedent for its holding on this issue. Rahn v.
Gerdts, 119 Ill.
App. 3d at 784, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
21. 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). For a discussion of Rickey, see
infra note 40.
22. Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683
(1978), affid, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (adopting reasoning of appellate court).
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contactual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977)

(emphasis added).
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emotional distress in actions based on its provisions. 23 The
Woodill court held that "physical harm" did not include emotional distress, but it did not define "physical harm. ' 24 The
Rahn court held that Woodill still controlled actions in strict
products liability in Illinois, 25 despite the recent extension of recovery for emotional distress to negligence actions in Rickey v.
26
Chicago TransitAuthority.
The Rahn court's interpretation of Rickey played an integral
role in its analysis of the strict products liability issue. The
court stated that the extension of recovery for emotional distress in Rickey was related to the nature of the defendant's conduct and that it was dependent upon the foreseeability of the
alleged injury. 27 The Rahn court refused to extend the Rickey
doctrine to strict products liability actions because the Illinois
Supreme Court has not extended the doctrine to such actions. 28
The Rahn court's interpretation of Rickey was also central
to its disposition of the negligence counts of the complaint.
There are varying interpretations of what specific types of inju29
ries are compensable under the rule announced in Rickey.
Under one interpretation, damages for emotional distress are recoverable. 30 Another interpretation states that only physical
manifestations of emotional distress are compensable. 3 1 The
Rahn court did not characterize Mrs. Rahn's injuries as either
purely emotional or as physical manifestations of emotional distress. The court in Rickey held that there may be recovery for
emotional distress without impact in negligence cases. 32 The
Rahn court, therefore, did not believe the issue required discussion. 33 Mrs. Rahn's injuries were compensable under a negligence theory of liability.34
An analysis of the Rahn decision reveals two possible approaches to the strict products liability issue. One approach emphasizes the scope of the plaintiff's interest in emotional
23. Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683, 688
(1978), affd, 79 Ill.
2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
24. Id.
25. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill.
App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
26. 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
27. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill.
App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
28. Id.
29. For a discussion of these various interpretations of Rickey, see infra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.

32. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill.
2d 546, 555, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5
(1983).
33. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill.
App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 810.
34. Id.
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tranquility. A court's analysis based on this approach centers
on whether it should impose liability based on fault.3 5 The other
approach emphasizes the potential scope of the defendant's liability. The analysis based on this approach focuses on whether
36
the court should impose strict liability.
Expanding protection of the individual's interest in emotional tranquility is usually advanced in cases where liability is
predicated on intentional or negligent misconduct. 37 These
cases, therefore, do not discuss recovery for emotional distress
in actions based on a no-fault theory of liability. The assumption underlying this approach is that the court cannot justify the
imposition of liability for emotional distress in a strict products
liability case unless the requirements for imposing liability for
emotional distress in a negligence case are met.38 This assump35. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5
(1983) (recognizing cause of action for emotional distress for those in "zone
of danger," i.e., those in danger of imminent physical harm); Public Fin.
Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89, 360 N.E.2d 765, 769 (1978) (disallowing recovery for emotional harm because defendant's conduct was not sufficiently
"extreme and outrageous"); Knierem v. Izzo, 22 IM. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157
(1961) (recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress). These cases focus primarily on the conduct of the defendant and
consider whether the individual's interest in emotional tranquility can be
adequately and judiciously afforded protection. For example, the Knierem
court discussed the intangible nature of the injury, the difficulty of assessing money damages for the injury, the possibility that recognition of the
cause of action might give rise to fictitious claims, and the fact that mental
consequences vary greatly from one individual to the next. Knierem v. Izzo,
22 Ill. 2d 73, 74-75, 174 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 (1961). The court concluded, however, that peace of mind is sufficiently important to receive protection
against intentional invasion. Id. at 77, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
38. Very few jurisdictions have considered the issue of whether recovery for emotional distress in strict products liability actions should be permitted. The first case to treat the issue in Illinois was Woodill v. Parke
Davis Co., 79 1ll. 2d 26, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1980). See supra note 20 (discussion
of Woodill).
One California appellate court held that emotional distress that is the
result of witnessing peril to another may be recovered when the defendant
would have been strictly liable for causing that peril. Shepard v. Super. Ct.,
76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 19-21, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (1977). Accord Walker v.
Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1982) (once liability is found,
there is no difference between damages that are recoverable under theories
of negligence, warranty or strict liability). The Shepard court extended the
foreseeable plaintiff test proposed in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441
P.2d 912, 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968), to strict products liability. Shepard v. Super. Ct., 76 Cal. App. 3d at 19-21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The Dillon
test was formulated to insure that only foreseeable plaintiffs could bring
actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The Dillon court held that the
plaintiff's physical proximity to the scene of the accident, the plaintiffs sensory perception of the accident, and the plaintiffs relationship to the injured party were the factors which should be used to determine whether
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tion leads to the application of concepts rooted in negligence to
39
solve strict products liability questions.
The Rahn court's use of fault principles to analyze a no-fault
form of liability is apparent in its discussion of Rickey.40 The
court stated that Rickey demonstrated that imposition of liability for emotional distress is related to the nature of the defendant's conduct. 4 1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates,
however, that the nature of the defendant's conduct is irrelevant
in determining whether liability should be imposed under the
provisions of Section 402A.4 To limit strict products liability
based on the nature of the defendant's conduct is inappropriate
since that conduct is irrelevant to a determination of liability.
The Rahn court's approach, therefore, applies a concept which is
irrelevant in determining the scope of a defendant's liability in a
strict products liability action.
The Rahn court's assertion that Rickey requires foreseeability of the alleged injury 43 to establish liability for emotional disthe plaintiff was foreseeable. The Dillontest was rejected in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 IM.2d at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 4 ("too vaguely defined to
serve as a yardstick"). It was replaced with the zone-of-physical-danger
rule. Id. For a discussion of Shepard,see Note, Shepard v. Superior Court:
Extending Dillon v. Legg to ProductLiability, 11 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 109
(1979).
39. This assumption ignores the fact that the reasons for imposing liability based upon fault and the reasons for imposing no-fault liability are
different. In cases involving negligent misconduct, for example, the liability
imposed is commensurate with the defendant's moral or social fault. See
generally 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 63-129 (Howe ed. 1963); R. POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 84 (rev. ed. 1954). The liability
imposed under a strict products liability theory, on the other hand, depends
upon allocating the risks which are associated with growing productivity.
See generally Weinstein, Twerski, Pierhler & Donaher, Product Liability:
An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
40. In Rickey, an action was brought on behalf of a boy who witnessed
his brother's strangulation in a negligently operated escalator. Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 2. Plaintiffs did not
allege any direct physical injury or impact. Id. The court held that a bystander who suffers emotional distress while in a negligently created zone
of physical danger may recover for the physical manifestations of that emotional distress. Id. at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. Prior to Rickey, a plaintiff had to
prove the existence of an impact before recovery for emotional distress
would be allowed. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657, 569
(1898). The Rickey zone-of-physical-danger rule only requires that the
plaintiff be "in such proximity to the accident in which the direct victim was
physically injured that there was a high risk to him of physical impact." 98
Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. The zone-of-physical-danger rule is, therefore,
not the same as the foreseeable plaintiff rule adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968). See supranote 37.
41. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a)

(1965).

note 22 and accompanying text.
43. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 809.

See supra
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tress leads to similar problems. Foreseeability is a negligence
concept formulated to insure that the defendant incurs only liability commensurate with his duty." It is erroneous to assume
that a concept which limits negligence liability applies equally
to limit strict products liability. 45 Illinois courts have applied
foreseeability analysis to other strict products liability questions.46 Notably, in Winnett v. Winnett,4 7 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that strict products liability only extends to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs.4 8 This foreseeability analysis determines who may bring a strict products liability action. It does
not, however, determine whether emotional injuries are compensable when the plaintiff could have reasonably been foreseen.49 The application of this foreseeability analysis to the
44. The injury must be the "natural and probable result of the negligent
act, but the precise injury, or the manner in which it occurs, does not have
to be reasonably foreseeable for a duty to be imposed." Neering v. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 380, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943), citing Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Oswald, 388 Ill. 270, 272, 170 N.E. 247, 249 (1930) (holding that
plaintiff failed to prove that she was exercising ordinary care for her own
safety). See also Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374-75, 308 N.E.2d 617, 619
(1974) (what is foreseeable defines scope of defendant's duty); Hartnett v.
331, 337, 106 N.E. 837, 839 (1914) (affirming
Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill.
directed verdict because injury was not foreseeable); Illinois Hous. Dev.
Auth. v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 261, 433 N.E.2d 1350, 1361
(1982) (creation of duty is foreseeability); Walsh v. A.D. Conner, Inc., 99 Ill.
App. 3d 427, 430, 425 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1981) (scope of duty turns on
foreseeability).
45. For criticism of the application of foreseeability analysis to strict
products liability questions, see Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and
Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. REV.
101 (1976). See also Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 254, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831
(1972) (foreseeability has no application in doctrine of strict liability in
tort).
46. One appellate court has held that the concept of proximate cause is
the same in strict products liability and negligence. Barr v. Rivinius, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 121, 127, 373 N.E.2d 1063, 1067 (1978) (proximate cause is dependent
on foreseeability of injury). See Niffenegar v. Lakeland Constr. Co., 95 Ill.
App. 3d 420,420 N.E.2d 262 (1981) (injury to employee while cleaning paving
machine held to be foreseeable and, therefore, compensable under strict
products liability theory). See also supra notes 13 and 20.
2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
47. 57 Ill.
48. Id. The Winnett court defined foreseeability as "that which is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur." Id.
at 12-13, 310 N.E.2d at 4-5. The Winnett court also stated, however, that
questions of foreseeability are usually for the jury to decide. Id. at 13, 310
N.E.2d at 5. Thus, if the test announced in Winnett is applied to determine
whether specific types of injuries are foreseeable, the question might still
go to the jury.
49. Mrs. Rahn was a foreseeable plaintiff since she was a user of the
vehicle. Mrs. Rahn would also meet the test formulated to determine
whether a plaintiff is foreseeable in actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In fact, if the Rahn court had applied the Rickey zone-ofphysical-danger rule to the facts of Rahn as the Shepard court applied the
Dillon rule to its facts, Mrs. Rahn would have been entitled to recover. See
supra note 38. The only possible application of foreseeability to the facts of
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issue of damages for emotional distress is questionable when a
more definitive approach is available.
A better approach to this strict products liability issue
would emphasize the appropriate extent of a defendant's liability in a strict products liability action. Woodill exemplifies this
approach.5 0 The Woodill court's reliance upon an interpretation
of "physical harm" in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts indicates that it was concerned with the proper basis of
liability in strict products liability cases. 51 Under this approach,
the policy which justifies the imposition of strict products liability also determines the extent of the defendant's liability. 52 This

approach emphasizes the policy considerations underlying
strict products liability rather than the fault concepts underly53
ing negligence theory.
Rahn, therefore, is to the specific type of injury alleged. It has been held,
however, that the specific injury alleged need not be reasonably foreseeable
in negligence cases. See supra note 44.
2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), affg 58
50. Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 79 Ill.
Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978). See supranotes 20-26 and accompanying text.
51. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has been adopted as the framework for causes of action based upon strict products liability. See supra
note 1.
52. The Suvada court stated that the public policy reasons which justify
imposition of strict liability are the "public interest in human life and
health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit."
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IlI. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
53. Once the concept of foreseeability is abandoned as the means to
limit strict products liability, a new concept must replace it. Otherwise, producers would become the absolute insurers of product safety. This result
has been held to be unacceptable. Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 190.
The rules of proximate causation enunciated in cases dealing with abnormally dangerous activities are well-suited to define the appropriate limits of strict products liability. See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866),
affid, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (defendant liable for natural consequences of
permitting water to escape from a reservoir built upon his land). According
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the strict liability imposed in abnormally dangerous activities cases is "limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF

TORTS § 519(2) (1977). Accord Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44

Wash. 2d 440, 442, 268 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1954). The Foster court quoted the
following view with approval:
It is one thing to say that a dangerous enterprise must pay its way
within reasonable limits, and quite another to say that it must bear responsibility for every extreme of harm that it may cause. The same

practical necessity for the restriction of liability within some reason-

able bounds, which arises in connection with problems of "proximate
cause" in negligence cases, demands here that some limit be set.... But
ordinarily in such cases no question of causation is involved, and the
limitation is one of the policy underlying liability.
Id., 268 P.2d at 647 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS
571 (4th ed. 1971) with approval).
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While Woodill represents a better-reasoned approach to the
strict products liability issue, it can be criticized for failing to
state the policy reasons which limit strict products liability to
physical harm. The use of "physical harm" in Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not explained in the comments following that section. Both the Woodill and Rahn courts
relied upon this provision, but neither court attempted to define
54
the term.
The purpose in analyzing Rahn from a scope of liability perspective is to justify limiting strict products liability to "physical
harm" in terms of the underlying policy considerations that
serve as the foundation of the tort. Under this formulation, a
court would consider whether the policy underlying imposition
of no-fault liability justifies a narrow or broad construction of
the term "physical harm. '5 5 Illinois courts have used this
56
method of analysis to define other terms used in Section 402A.
The Rahn court's failure to adopt this method of analysis to define "physical harm" leads to confusion. An analysis of the possible impact of the Rahn decision reveals this confusion.
To fully understand the impact of Rahn, the court's dismissal of the cause of action in strict products liability must be analyzed in conjunction with its ruling that the damage allegations
in the negligence counts were sufficient to state a cause of action.5 7 In remanding the negligence counts of the complaint, the
Rahn court did not characterize Mrs. Rahn's injuries as either
purely emotional or as physical manifestations of emotional
harm.5 8 There has been considerable controversy over exactly
what types of injuries are compensable under the Rickey zone54. The Rahn court's failure to define the term "physical harm" can be
criticized given the procedural history of the Woodill case. See supra note
20.

55. For a discussion of the policy considerations, see supra note 52.
56. See, e.g., Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923
(1977). In Lowrie, the court confronted the issue of whether a multi-level
garage was a "product" for strict products liability purposes. Id at 379, 365

N.E.2d at 925. The court considered the policy reasons underlying imposition of strict products liability and concluded that the building was not a

"product" within the meaning of that term in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 380, 365 N.E.2d at 928. Accord Immergluck v.

Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 472, 368 N.E.2d 803 (1977) (policy considerations used to determine that a sheltered-care facility was not a product). See Hartley, The Definition of a Productfor the Purposes of Section
402A, 1982 INs. L.J. 344.
The policy underlying imposition of strict products liability has also
been used to define the term "seller." See supra note 14.
57. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 455 N.E.2d at 810.
58. Id.
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of-physical danger rule.5 9 One interpretation maintains that

Rickey only compensates physical manifestations of emotional
injuries caused through fear for one's own safety. 60 Although
Mrs. Rahn's injuries can be interpreted as caused through fear
for her own safety, it is unclear how "severe depression, anxiety
and nervousness" can be characterized as physical manifestations of an emotional injury. 6 1 Another interpretation of Rickey
maintains that certain forms of emotional injury are themselves
compensable, as long as they are caused through fear for one's
own safety. 62 The Rahn court's holding is consistent with this

broader interpretation of Rickey because Mrs. Rahn's injuries
appeared to be purely emotional in nature. 63 Future recovery
for emotional distress in negligence actions will depend upon
whether other Illinois jurisdictions and, ultimately, whether the
Illinois Supreme Court, will accept the Rahn court's interpretation of the types of injuries recoverable under the rule announced in Rickey.
The Rahn court's dismissal of the strict products liability
counts presents problems similar to those created by the court's
remand of the negligence counts. Because the court did not define the term "physical harm," its holding on the strict products
liability issue can be given a narrow or broad construction. If
Mrs. Rahn's injuries are characterized as purely emotional, the
Rahn decision can be narrowly interpreted to preclude recovery
for purely emotional injuries. 64 If Mrs. Rahn's injuries are characterized as physical manifestations of emotional injury, the
59. For a discussion of the Rickey zone-of-physical-danger rule, see
supra note 40.
60. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 457, 210 A.2d 709,

714-15 (1965) (recovery only for physical manifestations of emotional distress, not emotional distress itself). For a discussion of how emotional dis-

tress causes physical disorders, see Reidy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distressin Illinois: Living in the Past,Suffering in the Present, 30 DE PAUL
L. REV. 295 (1981); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal
Liabilityfor Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 215-26 (1944) (reviewing

nervous shock litigation).
61. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 455 N.E.2d at 809.
62. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 18
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215 (N.D. Ill. 1983), later op., No. MDL-391 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
13, 1983) (pre-impact emotional distress held recoverable). For a criticism
of this interpretation of Rickey, see Note, Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority: Consistent Limitation on Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress in Illinois, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 563 (1984).
63. Unlike the plaintiffs in Rahn, the plaintiff in Rickey alleged "severe
functional, emotional, psychiatric and behavioral disorders." Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 548, 457 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1983). Whether these
symptoms are actually physical in nature is a subject of controversy. See,
e.g., Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1204-05 (D.S.D. 1983) (observing the degrees of manifestation which are physical in nature).
64. See supra note 60.
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Rahn decision can be broadly interpreted to deny recovery for
all types of emotional injury. 65 Future recovery of damages for
emotional distress in strict products liability actions, therefore,
will depend not only upon acceptance of the Rahn court's holding but also upon how narrowly or broadly courts interpret that
holding.
The most important issue facing Illinois courts in the area of
recovery for emotional distress is the perspective from which a
court should approach the strict products liability issue raised
in Rahn. A court can approach this issue from either the perspective which emphasizes the protected interest or from the
perspective which emphasizes the permissible scope of a defendant's liability. The protected interest approach will lead to
further application of concepts rooted in negligence. The permissible scope of liability approach will lead to the application
of concepts formulated to determine whether a court should impose strict liability. Illinois courts should follow this latter approach and concentrate on the scope of "physical harm," as that
term is used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, while keeping
a watchful eye on the policy considerations which justify imposition of strict products liability. This approach will place this
new form of liability on an independent foundation. Its use will
represent a courageous departure from principles rooted in fault
and will result in a new method of analyzing the issue of emotional harm in cases involving strict products liability.
James F. Martin

65. This broad denial of recovery would include physical manifestations
of emotional distress. See supra note 62.

